Observer to the Interim Committee of the EDC and US Special Representative to the ECSC High Authority

Documents from [1953] to [1954]

Identity Statement

HAEU Reference Code
Extent and Medium

n.23 files

Reference Archivists

Carr, Mary

Content and Structure


In Febuary 1953 John Foster Dulles, Secretary of State and close friend and admirer of Monnet, recommended President Eisenhower to appoint David Bruce as special US Observer at Interim Committee of EDC and special US Representative to European High Authority for coal and steel. Eisenhower favoured the idea of a "roving Ambassador" to visit appointed Ambassadors and form a common approach and understanding of issues involved in efforts to unify Europe. This decision was all the more unique because Bruce was a liberal Democrat and the new US Administration was Republican, but Monnet powers of persusion overcame this obstacle as he felt Bruce was the best person for the job. Bruce accepted readily the appointment and took the status of observer rather than Ambassador, he was also given responsibility for observing progress toward EPC. Bruce's primary concerns during this period lay in pressuring France to ratify the EDC Treaty, despite the fact that the EDC was a French initiative, an attempt to prevent the constitution of a GermanNational Army, René Pleven, Prime Minister of the time proposed in October 1950 what later became the EDC. The Paris Conference of the Pleven Plan commenced work 15 Febuary 1951 and the Treaty was signed in May 1952. Yet successive French Governments backed out of actually ratifying the Treaty. Between internal political stability, placating right and left wing opponents, problems caused by the war in Indochina and fear of German rearmament prevented the Treaty reaching the National Assembly until too late. Bruce felt that no French political leader from Georges Bidault to Pierre Mendés-France had the political courage to back it fully and to allow France take leadership in Europe. He felt the French failure to ratify the EDC Treaty consituted the greatest diplomatic triumph ever achieved by the USSR (JMAS/166). Mendés had struck the first blow by introducing a protocol at the Brussels Conference that represented no compromise whatsoever. The French at the same time bore the greatest loss, for the agreements at the London Conference meant the reconsitution of a German National Army and General staff and French losing out on the proferred leadership of Europe. Bruce felt that the British should take some to the blame, for their proposal at the London Conference gave the French the assurances for security they required and would have made the ratification of the EDC easier for the French to accept. Bruce's admiration for Monnet was un

Allied Materials

Location of Originals

The originals are held in various Archives and Presidential Libraries in the USA

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