The Maastricht Treaty
After months of preparation, the Rome European Council of December 1990 launched two Intergovernmental conferences (IGCs), one on Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and the other on European Political Union (EPU). These conferences negotiated amendments to the EC founding Treaties to strengthen economic and political cooperation.They concluded their work within a year with the signing of the Treaty on European Union (commonly known as Maastricht Treaty) by the Heads of State and Government of the EC member states at the European Council in Maastricht on 10–11 December 1991.
January 1991, a social partner Ad hoc working group on Treaty change
Social policy was among the issues addressed during the IGC on European Political Union. In January 1991, one month after the launch of the Conference, an ad hoc working group was set up to discuss Treaty revisions on social policy among the participants of the Val Duchesse process and alongside the IGC. This ad hoc group originates from the joint initiative of Commissioner for Social Affairs, Vasso Papandreou, and ETUC. Chaired by Commission Director-General Jean Degimbe, the group provided the Val Duchesse social partners with an unprecedented opportunity to influence and deliberate on Treaty drafts concerning social policy and dialogue.
In the room, January to October 1991
The social partners approached the negotiations in the ad hoc working group with different views on what they hoped to gain from Treaty reform. UNICE supported improved consultations but opposed further legislation on social policy at European level. It was also sceptical about European collective bargaining. In contrast, ETUC advocated for expanding Community powers in the social sphere and supported the development of a European framework for collective bargaining. This position was strongly backed by the European Parliament (EP). In the lead-up to and during the IGC, trade unions and the EP collaborated closely. ETUC explicitly urged its members to lobby Members of the European Parliament (MEPs), national parliamentarians, and national governments to influence the IGC’s activity. As we read in the document below, ETUC’s objective was “to ensure that the social dimension is an inseparable element in the reform of the Treaty on Economic Union. […] You should ‘stick to them like leeches’!”
Signing the agreement
The IGC and the ad hoc working group were dynamic and transformative processes that enabled experimentation and consensus-building. They involved multiple actors—including the Commission, EC Member States, and the social partners—whose positions and tactics evolved over time in unexpected ways. A key turning point for the working group was the shift from a more theoretical and political discussion on social policy competences, which remained a prerogative of Member States, to a concrete debate on bargaining procedures, moderated by the Commission. After eight meetings, the social partners reached an agreement on Treaty revision for social dialogue on October 31, 1991. This agreement was announced via a letter from the three secretary generals—Emilio Gabaglio (ETUC), Zygmunt Tyszkiewicz (UNICE), and Werner Ellerkmann (CEEP) — to the President of the Council of the European Communities, Ruud Lubbers.
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Prise de position du groupe ad hoc du dialogue social sur le rôle des partenaires sociaux composé par la Confédération européenne des syndicats (CES), de l'Union des confédérations de l'industrie et des employeurs d'Europe (UNICE) et du Centre européen de l'entreprise publique (CEEP) proposant une nouvelle rédaction pour les articles 118 4, 118 A et 118 B du projet de Traité sur l'UE / HAEU, CM3/NEGO7-00036/004.
Prise de position du groupe ad hoc du dialogue social sur le rôle des partenaires sociaux composé par la Confédération européenne des syndicats (CES), de l'Union des confédérations de l'industrie et des employeurs d'Europe (UNICE) et du Centre européen de l'entreprise publique (CEEP) proposant une nouvelle rédaction pour les articles 118 4, 118 A et 118 B du projet de Traité sur l'UE / HAEU, CM3/NEGO7-00036/004.
Prise de position du groupe ad hoc du dialogue social sur le rôle des partenaires sociaux composé par la Confédération européenne des syndicats (CES), de l'Union des confédérations de l'industrie et des employeurs d'Europe (UNICE) et du Centre européen de l'entreprise publique (CEEP) proposant une nouvelle rédaction pour les articles 118 4, 118 A et 118 B du projet de Traité sur l'UE / HAEU, CM3/NEGO7-00036/004.
This agreement proposed a revision of Articles 118(4), 118A and 118B of the Single European Act to strengthen the role of social partners in the Communities’ social dimension. Notably, it included the possibility for the European social partners to make agreements which could then be turned into EU legislation. UNICE welcomed the introduction of mandatory social partner consultations on any social policy proposal, while ETUC emphasized the responsibility of social partners in the construction of a social dimension of the internal market and the need for collective bargaining at all levels. According to CEEP, the agreement was a significant step for trade unions and employer organisations, who were now better positioned to influence European social policy.
UK opt-out
The social partner agreement was discussed by the IGC and, after minor, textual amendments, annexed to the Maastricht Treaty. However, one Member State did not wish to be bound by it: the United Kingdom. Following last-minute negotiations that involved Jacques Delors, the Commission’s legal service, and several Heads of State or Government—including Helmut Kohl, François Mitterrand, and Giulio Andreotti—, the UK was granted an “opt-out” and was, thus, not bound by the agreement.
“II testo che mettemmo a punto con I'accordo dei sindacati fu poi diffuso alle varie riunioni dei Premiers democristiani, nonche dei primi Ministri socialisti. Tuttavia il Consiglio europeo arrivò al secondo giorno senza che fosse mai discussa la riforma del capitolo sociale del Trattato. John Major rinviava in permanenza il dibattito sugli aspetti sociali. Quando inizio il dibattito ci fu un veto assoluto da parte sua. A questa punto Helmut Kohl e François Mitterrand dichiararono la lora volonta di accettare un opting out inglese facendo, però, una proposta franco-tedesca appoggiata dagli italiani. Fu la prima volta che senti parlare Giulio Andreotti di economia sociale di mercato, sposando la formula tedesca. II testo fu pasticciato, per via della fretta con cui furono costretti a concessioni. Presero un testo che non era mai stato discusso nemmeno a livello tecnico e che risaliva alla Presidenza lussemburghese, facendolo convergere negli attuali articoli 1 e 2 del Protocollo a cui fu poi aggiunto il testo delle parti sociali, che costituisce gli articoli 3 e 4. E un testo un po' contraddittorio che fu, tuttavia, adottato.”
Source: Interview of Carlo Savoini by M. G. Melchionni on 09 February 1998 - 16 April 1998 / HAEU, INT594.
Image Source: European Council - Maastricht 1991. Photo: Christian Lambiotte / European Commission Audiovisual Service, P-002371/06-1. Copyright European Communities, 1991.
Carlo Savoini (IT)
Official of the European Commission, in Directorate-General V, responsible for Social Affairs and Industrial Relations
The Interpretation of the Treaty
In the end, the Maastricht Treaty included both the limited social policy provisions of the old Single European Act by which the UK was bound, and the new, reformed and expanded competences and procedures that were adopted by the 11 other Member States. Despite the UK’s opt-out, this reform marked a substantial and significant achievement for social partners, who for the first time became actively involved in Treaty-making and acquired a meaningful status within the EU’s constitutional architecture. The compromised text of the new provisions nonetheless left room for interpretation regarding the actual implementation of social dialogue. A battle over the meaning and interpretation of this agreement would unfold in the following years which shaped the practical role of social partners in European integration.
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